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The idea that the government should not issue debt and that present
generations should not bind future generations has been discussed for over
200 years.' Representative Harold Knutson introduced the first
constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget in 1936.2 During
the 1980s, as the federal deficit exploded, the idea of adding a
constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget became extremely
popular. In the ensuing years several balanced budget amendments have
been considered by both houses of Congress. 3
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1 Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Taylor on November 26, 1798, stating "I wish it were possible to
obtain a single amendment to our Constitution. I mean an additional article taking from the Federal
Government the power of borrowing." THEWRIrINGSoFTHoMAS JEFFERSON, 1795-1801, viii, 310 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., 1896). Cf. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson "Debts may be incurred
with a direct view to the interests of the unborn, as well as of the living ... all that seems indispensable
in stating the account between the dead and the living is, to see that the debts against the latter do not
exceed the advances made by the former." THE COMPLETEMADISON, His BASIC WRINGS 30 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1953). Note that Thomas Jefferson did not follow his own advice when as President he
advocated that the country borrow $15 million for the purchase of the Louisiana Territories. THnD
ANNUAL MESSAGE, viii, 27. FORD ED., viii, 271 (Oct. 1803).
2 H.R.J. Res. 579, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
3 For a legislative history of the balanced budget amendment see S. REP. No. 5, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1995); SENATE Co1MIrn o mo BUDGET, PROPOSEDCONSTFlUT oNALAENDMENrS TO
BALANCETHE FEDERAL BuIXErr-A LEGISLATIrE ISTORY (100th Cong. S. Prt. 103-95, 101st. Cong. S.
Prt. 103-94, 102d Cong. S. Prt. 103-92, 103d Cong. S. Prt. 103-112). See also, William G. Dauster,
Budget Process Issues of 1993, 9 J.L. AND POL 9 (1992). There are several versions of the balanced
budget amendment, this paper analyzes H.R.J. Res. 1, which passed the House of Representatives on
January 26, 1995. The same amendment was offered in the Senate as S.J. Res. 1. The amendment
states:
SECTION 1. Total outlays for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that
fiscal year, unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House of Congress shall
provide by law for a specific excess of outlays over receipts by a rollcall vote.
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The balanced budget amendments considered by Congress would have
a dramatic impact on the balance of power between the three branches of
government and could increase the role of the judiciary in the budget
process.4 The fear of judicial involvement led one constitutional scholar to
claim that the consequences of a balanced budget amendment will be "full
employment for lawyers."5  Limiting judicial involvement, however,
introduces a classic "catch 22": If only Congress can enforce the
amendment,6 and Congress already has the constitutional power to balance
the budget, the amendment provides no additional power for Congress to
balance the budget Congress could simply change the definition of
outlays, receipts, or debt, or deem an almost-balanced budget balanced.8
SECTION 2. The limit on the debt of the United States held by the public shall not be
increased, unless three-fifths of the whole number of each House shall provide by law
for such an increase by rollcall vote.
SECTION 3. Prior to each fiscal year, the President shall transmit to the Congress a
proposed budget for the United States Government for that fiscal year, in which total
outlays do not exceed total receipts.
SECTION 4. No bill to increase revenue shall become law unless approved by a
majority of the whole number of each House by a roll-call vote.
SECTION 5. The Congress may waive the provisions of this article for any fiscal year
in which a declaration of war is in effect. The provisions of this article may be waived
for any fiscal year in which the United Sates is engaged in military conflict which
causes an imminent and serious military threat to national security and is so declared
by a joint resolution, adopted by a majority of the whole number of each House, which
becomes law.
SECTION 6. The Congress shall enforce and implement this article by appropriate
legislation, which may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts.
SECTION 7. Total receipts shall include all receipts of the United States Government
except those derived from borrowing. Total outlays shall include all outlays of the
United States Government except for those for repayment of debt principal.
SECTION 8. This article shall take effect beginning with fiscal year 2002, or with the
second fiscal year beginning after ratification, whichever is later.
H.R.J.Res. 1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. H753 (Jan. 26, 1995).
4 In the Federalist Papers No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the judiciary should have "no
influence over either the sword or the purse." THE FEDERA1sr No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
5 Balanced Budget Amendment-S.J. Res. 41: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1994) (statement of Kathleen Sullivan, professor, Stanford
University).
6 Senator Simon, the sponsor of the amendment in the Senate during the 103d Congress, stated that
the Courts will not get involved in tax and spending decisions. 140 CONG REc. S1866 (daily ed. Feb.
24, 1994). Senator Hatch, the Republican sponsor of the amendment in the 104th Congress, stated "I
believe, if my colleague looks at facts, he looks at the law, he looks at the Court, there is really no
question that the courts cannot enforce this." 141 CONG. REc. S1835 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995). See also,
infra sections I.A and B.
7 The amendment does include a provision which would require a three-fifths majority of the
whole number of each house (i.e., 60 votes in the Senate; 261 in the House) for outlays to exceed
receipts and to raise the debt ceiling. The three-fifths majority of the whole number would make it
more difficult to take such action and could therefore be seen as an enforcement mechanism. However,
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Legislators want to balance the budget, but they also want to fund
programs and. keep taxes low. The conflict between the desire for a
balanced budget and the unwillingness to take the politically dangerous
steps to produce one may lead to creative accounting or budget gimmicks
to avoid the balanced budget requirement. As the Wisconsin Supreme
Court noted regarding the state legislature's willingness to avoid a
balanced budget requirement, "The history of the Wisconsin constitutional
provision concerning municipal debt manifests both an abhorrence for
public debt and a willingness to increase the debt limit, particularly for
school purposes."9
This paper examines state experiences with balanced budget
amendments and asserts that the unintended consequences of a balanced
budget amendment will be increased judicial activism regarding fiscal
policy. It also discusses the legislative history surrounding the federal
balanced budget amendment [hereinafter "Federal Amendment" or
"Amendment"], and the current law regarding justiciability to show that
these doctrines will not insulate the Amendment from judicial intervention.
I. STATE COURT ADJUDICATION INTERPRETING
STATE BALANCED BUDGET AMENDMENTS
Since forty-eight of the fifty states have some type of balanced budget
restriction, proponents of the Federal Amendment often point to the state
experience as an example of what will happen if there is a Federal
Amendment. 10 In both economic and judicial analyses, however, the state
example can only provide partial instruction. Although most states claim
to balance their budgets, they separate their budgets into capital and
operating budgets, and they balance only their operating budgets.
Therefore, states can balance their operating budgets while continuing to
accrue debt in their capital budgets. The federal government, in
comparison, does not have a capital budget, and it does not separate capital
and operating expenses for accounting purposes."
the debt limit provision in the balanced budget amendment could be achieved without a constitutional
amendment. See Exon Amendment, S. REP. No. 82, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1995).
8 In fact, in the hearing before the Senate Judiciary on S.J. Res. 1, Senator Simon stated that a
budget which was two or three percent in deficit would be considered in balance. Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 5, 1995)(transcript available from the
Committee).
9 Dieck v. Unified School Dist. of Antigo., 477 N.W.2d 613 (Wis. 1991).
10 S. REP. No. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1995).
11 Debt for state and local governments has increased steadily over the last twenty years. 141
CoNa REc S2090 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1995)(statement by Senator Sarbanes)(citing census data-debt of
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This section examines state cases to determine the course of state courts
regarding the justiciability of balanced budget requirements. The state
experience reflects significant judicial involvement in interpreting state
balanced budget requirements. In addition, contrary to the contention of
many supporters of the Federal Amendment, state and local governments
have often evaded balanced budget requirements, sometimes with the
consent of the courts. Governors also have used the balanced budget
requirements to justify actions and powers that would have been
impermissible in the absence of an amendment. State experiences suggest
that if the United States Constitution is amended to include a balanced
budget requirement, the federal courts will be forced to make judicial
determinations regarding budget policy. Furthermore, the state cases
provide insight into the problems that courts may confront when
interpreting a federal balanced budget amendment. 2
A. State Courts Have Defined Budgetary Terms in Balanced Budget
Amendments
1. Receipts and Outlays
The Federal Amendment requires that "Total outlays for any fiscal year
shall not exceed total receipts for that fiscal year.... "13 Although the
committee report discusses the terms "outlays" and 'receipts,"' 4 their
specific meaning remains unclear.
In 1949, the Idaho Supreme Court examined the definition of revenue
under the Idaho balanced budget amendment. 15 Idaho has a constitutional
requirement that prohibits local governments from "exceeding in that year,
the income and revenue provided for it for such year .... "16 Thus, local
governments in Idaho essentially must keep their accounts on a cash basis.
state and local government). See also G. Robert Morris, Jr, Evading Debt Limitations With Public
Building Authorities: The Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE LJ. 234 (1958)(citing
methods States use to evade their Constitutional requirements). See also, The Balanced Budget
Amendment: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 41-42 (Pt. 1)
(1995)(Governor Allen acknowledged that Virginia's balanced budget requirement allows for debt to
be issued as long as interest on the debt does not exceed five percent of general revenues.).
12 For a contrary view that state examples show that the courts will not get involved with the
amendment, see David Lubecky, Note, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amendment: The
Lesson From State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 563 (1986). See also Letter from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Hatch (Jan. 9, 1995)(letter available from the Senate Committee
on the JudiciaryX"[tlhere has not been a significant amount of litigation in the states interpreting their
balanced budget provisions, and that is a factor that weighs against the argument that there would be an
avalanche of litigation under a federal balanced budget amendment.").
13 See supra, note 3.
145. REP. No. 163, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1994).
15 Iverson v. Canyon County, 204 P.2d 259 (Idaho 1949).16 IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
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Canyon County levied a tax to prospectively budget for the construction
of a new jail. The revenues from the tax were accumulated in the current
expense account. Once sufficient funds existed, the county started
construction. 17 The county was sued for violating the Idaho Constitution,
since in the year the county was spending the surplus, expenditures
exceeded income. Finding the situation counter-intuitive, the Iverson court
held that surplus funds in one fiscal year may be treated as revenue in the
next fiscal year.18 Thus, the definition of revenue now includes surplus
funds from past fiscal years; accordingly, Canyon County's revenues and
expenditures were deemed balanced in that year. By expanding the
definition of revenue, the Idaho Court allowed the county to budget
prospectively even with the balanced budget requirement.
Iverson exemplifies one of the many problems that might arise at the
federal level and highlights why the federal courts might intervene in
budget policy. For example, an Iverson scenario could arise when the
government utilizes surplus funds from the Unemployment Insurance Trust
Fund.19 The Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund is designed to build up
surpluses during times of positive economic growth and low
unemployment, and pay out these surpluses during recessions. The Federal
Amendment would require that revenues not exceed expenditures in that
fiscal year. So in the year that the economy went into a downturn and the
payments from the unemployment trust fund were expended, the budget
would not be in balance-in violation of the Constitution. However, just
as in Iverson, disbursing the expenditures from the trust fund is prudent.
The United States Supreme Court might hear such a case and determine,
as did the Idaho Supreme Court, that surplus funds may be treated as
revenue. Alternatively, the Court might determine that the legislative
history of the Federal Amendment reveals that Congress was aware of this
problem and chose not to resolve it. Thus, the Court could find that
Congress must have expected that unemployment insurance, Social
Security and other trust funds would be funded on a pay-as-you go basis.
2. Expenditures
The Federal Amendment requires that outlays not exceed receipts.
North Carolina has a similar provision which requires that "total
expenditures ... shall not exceed the total of receipts."20 In Boneno v.
17 Iverson, 204 P.2d at 261.
18 Id.
19 The same logic of this paragraph would apply to all federal trust funds.
2D N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5(3).
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State,21 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was faced with determining
the definition of an expenditure. Plaintiffs argued that entering into a
contractual obligation was an expenditure under the balanced budget
amendment.2 However, the court held that an "expenditure occurs only
when funds are disbursed."' 3
The issue regarding contractual obligations also arises in determining
whether contractual obligations may be considered debt under balanced
budget amendments. 24 The North Carolina method takes a very limited
view of expenditure. If such a definition is followed at the federal level
and only disbursed funds are considered expenditures, then the government
will have far more flexibility in designing schemes to subvert the
Amendment. Borrowing authorities, loan guarantees, lease arrangements,
and trust funds would all be valid mechanisms for balancing the budget.
3. Appropriations
In Karcher v. Kean,25 the New Jersey Governor, Thomas Kean, deleted
monetary and legislative language from an appropriations bill.26 Alan
Karcher, Speaker of the General Assembly of New Jersey, sued claiming
that Kean had exceeded his line-item veto authority by expanding the veto
to cover nonmonetary provisions included in the appropriations bill.27 The
court was thus faced with determining what was, in fact, an appropriation.
The lower court held that the line-item veto was limited to pure
appropriations of money and did not extend to other subject matter.28 The
Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed this decision and held that the
Governor has veto power over any subject matter in an appropriations bill
as long as it is "broadly related to the [s]tate's fiscal affairs." 29
21 284 S.E.2d 170 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
22 id.
231d. at 171.
24 See infra, section I.B.3.
25 479 A.2d 403 (N.J. 1984).
26 Id. at 405. Line-Item Veto authority is granted to the Governor under the New Jersey
Constitution. N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1.
2 7 Karcher, 479 A.2d at 405.
28 In re Karcher, 462 A.2d 1273, 1278 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1983); see also State ex rel
Stephan v. Carlin, 631 P.2d 668, 672 (Kan. 1981Xdefining an appropriation as "the designation of
specific sums of money which the legislature authorizes may be spent for specific purposes.");
Cenarrusa v. Andrus, 582 P.2d 1082, 1090 (Idaho 1978)(holding that the governor can only veto
appropriations and defining appropriations as items that actually dedicated sums of money to a specific
purpose); Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 599 (Tex. 1975)("if the language is
intended to set aside funds for a specified purpose, it is an 'item of appropriation' and is therefore
subject to veto by the Governor.").
29 Karcher, 479 A.2d at 416; but cf. Cenarrusa4 582 P.2d at 1090 (Idaho 1978)(governor only can
veto appropriations and define them as items that actually dedicate sums of money to a specific
purpose); lessen Associates, Inc., 531 S.W.2d at 599 (rex. 1976)("the Governor must veto the entire
bill or let the objectionable part stand.").
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In Karcher, the court was forced to interpret the scope of a
constitutional provision. Specifically, the court examined the question of
whether a provision becomes an appropriation whenever such provision is
included in an appropriations bill. A similar problem may arise under
proposed balanced budget amendments.
The Federal Amendment requires that all revenue bills must pass by a
majority of the whole number of each House.3 Under the scoring rules
used by the Congressional Budget Office, nonbudgetary legislation often
has a revenue effect. If a piece of legislation is designed for a nonrevenue
raising purpose, but the effect of the legislation will be to raise revenue,
Section 4 of the balanced budget amendment would require that the
legislation be passed by the whole number of each body.31
For example, if Congress passed legislation to change the rules
regarding the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) 32 and further limited
the reach of regulations under the Act, the nonbudgetary legislative change
would have a revenue impact. 3  Under the Federal Amendment, any piece
of legislation which included changes to the CRA would require a
constitutional majority because it is "a bill to increase revenues."
Just as the Karcher court had to become actively involved in
determining what provisions of the Budget Bill were appropriations, the
judiciary might have to become equally involved in deciding which
provisions of each bill increase revenue and, therefore, require a
constitutional majority. The judiciary also may have to interpret whether
the Federal Amendment applies to all bills which raise any amount of
revenue, or only to "classic" revenue bills which originate in the House of
Representatives.
B. State Attempts to Evade Balanced Budget Requirement by Redefining
Debt
As noted earlier, state and local government debt has been growing
steadily since 1972. If forty-eight states have balanced budget
30 H. R. J. Res. 1, supra note 3.
31 Super or special majorities such as those found in Section 4 can have a significant impact on the
passage of legislation. One famous example involves a vote in the House of Representatives in 1941 to
extend the draft just prior to World War II. The vote in favor of extending the draft was 204 to 201.
Such a margin was sufficient to extend the draft but would not have been sufficient to meet the Section
4 requirement (i.e., 218 votes). See, John G. Leyden, How Mr. Sam Saved the Draft, WASH. PoST, Aug.
18, 1991, at C5.
32 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
33 If Congress eliminates CRA regulations, the Federal Reserve will need less regulators and will
therefore increase its profits. Profits from the Federal Reserve are paid to the Treasury. These
payments are considered revenue for budgetary purposes.
1996]
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requirements, and debt is rising, then most states cannot actually be
balancing their budgets. State and local governments have been very
creative in their financing methods and, as a result, several court cases have
been brought to question these maneuvers.34
1. Anticipatory Notes
New York State courts have reviewed several cases regarding the
State's issuance of debt. 3 In Wein v. State,36 the New York Court of
Appeals examined the question of whether appropriations at an
extraordinary session of the legislature in mid-fiscal year financed by
short-term notes are a gift or loan in violation of the New York
Constitution.37 The Wein I court determined that such borrowing is neither
a gift nor a loan and is proper in a limited fashion as long as the notes are
issued in anticipation of future revenues from taxes.3 The court also
concluded, however, that although this action was proper, the State drove
"to the brink of a valid practice."39 Finally, the court found that short-term
borrowing, which must be repaid within one year, "imposes no burden
upon our children."'' 4
Wein I created a loophole for New York State. The State can balance
the budget by short-term notes in one year, and, in the next year, issue new
notes to cover a new shortfall. In effect, the entire debt can simply be
reissued every year. The court recognized this problem and said that it
would be a violation of the "spirit" of this provision if anticipatory notes
were issued in the next year and there was a rollover of past notes. 4'
In Wein 1,42 the court's fears were, in fact, realized. New York issued
tax anticipatory notes for two successive years.43 To determine if the
34 The federal government might follow the states' example and obfuscate the Amendment by
redefining debt. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General Sheila Anthony, 141 CONG. IWc. S2706
(daily ed. Feb 15, 1995)(The Amendment requires that "any increase in the limit on the debt must be
passed by a three-fifths roll call vote of the whole number of each House of Congress." The Office of
Manaement and Budget has no such definition.).
" yWein v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586 (N.Y. 1976) [hereinafter Wein I]; Wein v. Carey, 362 N.E.2d 587
(N.Y. 1977) [hereinafter Wein I1].
36 347 N.E.2d 586 (1976).
37 Id. at 586-587. Under the New York State Constitution, "money of the state shall not be given
or loaned to or in aid of any private corporation or association, or private undertaking; nor shall the
credit of the state be given or loaned to or in aid of any individual, or public or private corporation or
assocation, or private undertaking...." N.Y. CONST. art VII, § 8, subd. 1.
38 Wein 1, 347 N.E.2d at 587. See also Hovey v. Foster, 21 N.F. 39 (Ind. 1889)(approving the
temporary loan of $700,000 to pay unexpected deficiencies in the budget).
39 Wein 1, 347 N.E.2d at 590.
40Id. at 591.4 1 Id. at 593.
42 Wein 11, 362 N.E.2d 587 (1977).
43 Id. at 590-91.
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issuance was constitutional, the court looked to the intent of the
budgeters."4 If the notes were issued with the dishonest knowledge that
there was no anticipated, authentic balance, there could be no authority to
issue the notes, 45 but the court placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove
improper budget manipulation. 4 By setting such a high burden of proof,
the court essentially allowed New York to continue to issue short-term
bonds and to reissue those bonds if necessary in succeeding fiscal years.
Some commentators have used the Wein cases to predict that taxpayers
will have very limited access to the courts on the federal level 7 and that
courts may be unwilling to make specific budgetary decisions.48 The Wein
cases also show, however, a very active court. In both cases the New York
court was willing to get actively involved in the budgetary process and
make decisions about what the state could and could not do regarding
bonding authority. If the Wein activism were applied at the federal level,
courts would monitor the borrowing decisions of the federal government.
2. Development Authorities
One way state and local governments have increased their borrowing
potential is through development authorities. These quasi-governmental
agencies have authority to borrow funds to build capital projects, and this
indebtedness is usually not considered debt for the purpose of balanced
budget requirements.
In Nations v. Downtown Development Authority,49 the Georgia Supreme
Court reviewed a development authority financing arrangement for
consistency with the Georgia Constitution. The constitution fixes a limit
on the debt that may be incurred and requires any debt to be approved by a
majority of the voters.50 However, the financial arrangement, which
44Id. at 591.
45 Id.
46Id. at 592.
47See Lubecky, supra note 12, at 563, 574-577; see also Wein v. Comptroller of New York, 386
N.E.2d 242 (N.Y. 1979)(holding taxpayer did not have standing to challenge the issuance of municipal
bonds).
4' Wein 1, 347 N.E. 2d at 591. Assuming it were feasible to convert a courtroom into a super-
auditing office to receive and criticize the budget estimates of a state with an $11 billion budget, the
idea is not only a practical monstrosity but would duplicate exactly what the Legislature and the
Governor do together, in harmony or in conflict, most often in conflict for several months of each year.
49 338 S.E.2d 240 (Ga. 1985)[hereinafter Nations AJ, 345 S.E.2d 581 (Ga. 1986)[hereinafter
Nations 11].
50 GEORGIA CONST. art. IX, § V, para. I.
(a) The debt incurred by any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of
this state, including debt incurred on behalf of any special district, shall never exceed
10 percent of the assessed value of all taxable property within such county,
municipality, or political subdivision; and no such county, municipality, or other
political subdivision shall incur any new debt without the assent of a majority of the
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involved a complex lease scheme, was not submitted to the voters.
Although this was a highly technical case regarding indebtedness, the court
heard the case and found the action permissible since the payments were
not considered to be debt under Georgia law.51
This case arose when the City of Atlanta wanted to build a marketplace
downtown. In order to avoid the state bonding requirement, it borrowed
through the Downtown Development Authority (DDA).52 However, the
city also needed to take the property by eminent domain, and the DDA did
not have the necessary authority.53 The city thus developed a complicated
process whereby the city would acquire the property by eminent domain 4
The DDA would then issue bonds, the proceeds of which would reimburse
the city5 Once the property was acquired, the city would lease the
property to the DDA, and the DDA would sublease it to a private developer
who would sublease to private companies.56 The developer would pay the
DDA a percentage of the rent and the DDA would pay as rent to the city all
projected revenues, which would then be used by the city to pay the
principal and interest on the bonds.57
Property owners who were going to lose their property by eminent
domain brought suit claiming that this action violated the Georgia
Constitution.58 The Georgia court approved the arrangement.59
The federal budget process could be influenced significantly by these
types of arrangements. Congress could pay nongovernmental agencies to
build government buildings. The developers would borrow to build the
buildings and the government would pay the debt service plus a fee as rent.
The government would sign a long-term contract for the approximate life
of the building. The fee to the government and our national indebtedness
qualified voters of such county, municipality, or political subdivision voting in an
election held for that purpose as provided by law.
51 Nations !, 338 S.E.2d at 241.
52Id. at 243.
53 id. at 241.
541d.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 1d.
59 In Nations I, the court rejected the city's lease arrangement because the city was guaranteeing to
make up 90 percent of any shortfall which existed because projected revenues were inadequate. The
court in Nations I found this to be a loan of credit of the city in violation of the Constitution. The city
renegotiated the lease requirements and the court approved the arrangement in Nations 11, 345 S.E.2d
581 (1986). See also, Dieck v. Unified School District of Antigo, 477 N.W. 2d 613 (Wis.
1991)(Plaintiff's argued that the lease purchase agreement was expressly designed to create
indebtedness without giving voters an opportunity to vote. The court held that since the school district
had the right to terminate the lease, the lease did not constitute indebtedness.).
[Vol. XII: 153
Will Judges Become Accountants?
would be the same as if the government had borrowed the money. The
builder would be able to secure a reasonable interest rate because he would
have a long-term contract from the government, though the rate would be
higher than that charged the government. The government could use this
type of contractual arrangement to avoid the restrictions under the
Amendment. 60
Another way the United States government could avoid the balanced
budget requirement is through loan guarantees. The President recently
submitted a plan to Congress which would have provided loan guarantees
to Mexico.61 These loan guarantees would have provided the full faith and
credit of the United States to Mexico and allowed the Mexican government
to obtain loans it might otherwise have been unable to obtain. These
guarantees have a budget cost for the federal government depending on the
riskiness of the guarantee, but the entire guarantee is not considered debt.62
The United States could guarantee a loan for forty billion dollars to a
private corporation set up for this purpose. The private corporation could
then borrow on the credit of the United States. The debt would be used for
public education, road construction, or for any other purpose. The United
States budget would have to account for a portion of the risk of the loan in
its yearly budget,63 but the forty billion dollars would not be charged
against the United States Treasury. The debt service for these loans would
be paid as payments to the private corporation who would in turn pay the
debt. The United States would thus be able to borrow without incurring
"debt," but it would still have to pay the interest costs associated with this
plan.
This type of financing arrangement is probably legal under the Federal
Amendment. There would be some cost as a result of the imputed value of
the risk of the loan. The United States would be using a nongovernment
corporation as its financing mechanisms, but otherwise it would be similar
to the current actions of the U.S. Treasury. The government would not run
6 This example highlights that a balanced budget requirement may cost the government money in
the long run. In order to take on capital projects, the government may have to contract with outside
parties. Since outside parties cannot borrow on the full faith and credit of the United States, they will
pay higher interest rates, and the federal government will have higher "rent" costs for the project.
61 See George Graham, et al., Mexican Rescue: Bitter Legacy of Battle to Bail out Mexico, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1995, at 4.
62 Under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990, the government is required to account for a
percentage of loan guarantees in the operating budget. These fees are determined by the amount and
risk of the loan. 2 U.S.C. § 661 (1994). See WwAM G. DAUSTER, BUDGET PROcEssLAw ANNOTATED
273-298 (1993 ed.).
63 2 U.S.C. §661 (1994).
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up debt as such but would, instead, run up "rents" that it would owe to
private corporations.
The legislative history does not address this issue nor does it
contemplate these arrangements. The drafters attempted to prevent this
type of borrowing by defining receipts to exclude those derived from
borrowing. 64 However, if the government uses loan guarantees, it does not
spend the money; the private corporation does under contracts with the
government. If the Supreme Court considers the state cases or the plain
text of the amendment as a guide, then these arrangements would be
permissible.P
3. Lease Arrangements
Another method used by states to avoid balanced budget amendments is
to create lease arrangements with third parties. In Dieck v. Unified School
District of Antigo,6 a school board entered into a lease contract with a not-
for-profit organization to build a high school. The agreement included
both a purchase option and a termination provision which allowed the
school district to terminate the lease by nonpayment of rent.67 Plaintiff
brought suit claiming that the school district incurred unlawful
indebtedness when it entered into the lease arrangement. 68
The court held that since the termination clause in the lease eliminated
future obligations, it did not violate the Wisconsin Constitution.69 Debt is
incurred when a "municipal body is under an obligation to pay and the
creditor has a right to enforce payment against the municipal body."' 7
Under this definition, a lease arrangement would be considered "debt" if
there was no termination clause.
Dieck has major ramifications at the federal level. The federal
government enters into lease arrangements on a regular basis. For
example, the government often rents office space instead of building a
federal building. Under the Dieck logic, all of these contracts would have
to have cancellation clauses or they would be considered debt. Such a
requirement would be unrealistic and expensive at the federal level.
64S. REP. No. 163, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1993).
65 In order to prevent these types of arrangements, the Amendment would need to include a
prohibition on granting the full faith and credit of the United States to other parties. If such a
prohibition was included in the Amendment, the government could not use loan guarantees to
circumvent the Amendment.
66 477 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Wis. 1991).
671d.
68Id. at 617.
69Id. at 618-19.
70id. at 618.
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4. Accounting for Future Obligations
In addition to lease arrangements, states have several other methods
which use future obligation to pay for present expenditures. Since these
methods often create obligations for future generations, they may be
deemed debt under the Federal Amendment.
In Prudential Property and Casualty Co. v. Grimes, 71 the State of
Oklahoma attempted to use funds collected in a reserve account to pay for
current expenses. Oklahoma had instituted a tax on out-of-state insurance
companies. Subsequently, the companies challenged the levy based on the
Equal Protection Clause72 While the challenge was pending, the insurance
companies continued to pay the levy under protest, and the protest
payments were collected in the Insurance Commissioner's Protest Fund.73
From 1981 to 1986 over fifty-five million dollars was paid into the fund.74
The State of Oklahoma transferred thirteen million dollars in interest from
the insurance fund to the general fund and proposed transferring another
forty-two million dollars.75 The insurance companies sued to enjoin the
transfer of funds. 76 The majority granted the injunction based upon
statutory interpretation77 , but the concurrence raised several questions
regarding whether the transfer violated Oklahoma's balanced budget
amendment.7
The concurrence argued that there is a constitutional obligation for a
balanced budget and that part of the purpose of this provision was to ensure
that one legislative assembly does not bind future assemblies financially. 79
By allocating the money in the protest fund for the current budget, the
legislature was incurring a possible future obligation to return those funds
if Prudential Property and Casualty was successful in their suit.80
While the majority of the Oklahoma court determined that the transfer
of funds from one fund to the other violated Oklahoma statutory
provisions, the concurrence raised a question which may have a significant
implication at the federal level-how should future obligations be counted
for purposes of the Amendment?
71 725 P.2d 1246, 1247 (Okla. 1986).
72Id. at 1247.
73 Id.
7 4 1d.
7 5 1d.
76 1d. at 1248.
77 Id. at 1247-51.
78 Id. at 1251-52 (Wilson, J., concurring specially).
79 Id.
"°Id. at 1251.
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This issue was raised several times during the debate on the
Amendment. For instance, should the IOUs to the Social Security system
be treated as future obligations or should they be accounted for in the
current budget? Should the United States be required to create "protest
funds" for pending legislation? Should revenues paid to the Federal
Treasury under protest be considered revenues for purposes of the
Amendment prior to a final judgment on the merits of the case? The
judiciary may not have to get involved in every one of these cases;
however, Grimes shows that there is some support among state judges to
count future obligations as debt. This same question may come before the
Supreme Court under the Federal Amendment with significant
consequences."1
C. Increased Executive Power
1. Executive Authority to Impound Funds
The opponents of the Federal Amendment fear that it will increase the
President's power to impound funds.82 Both the President and Congress
take an oath to uphold the Constitution; consequently, if the President
believes that spending would violate the Constitution, he may have a duty
to impound funds. 83
Many state governors already have the power of a line item veto, but
there are several state cases where governors or legislators have either tried
to impound, or withhold funds that they would otherwise be obligated to
spend. The passage of the Federal Amendment may shift the balance of
power and give the President more power over spending decisions.
In Judy v. Schaefer,84 people on public assistance sued the State of
Maryland, challenging the Governor's reduction in benefits. The plaintiffs
argued that the grant of impoundment authority to the Governor violated
the principle of separation of powers inherent in the Maryland Constitution
81 If the Court held that the future obligations to Social Security were debt and thus needed to be
accounted for in the present budget, then it would be far more difficult for Congress to achieve a
balanced budget under the Amendment. Without specifically doing so, the Court would be requiring
Congress to raise taxes or drastically cut spending to meet this requirement.
82 President Nixon asserted his right to impound funds, but courts found that his action violated the
Constitution. AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 75 (1973). In response to Nixon's action, Congress
passed the Federal Impoundment and Information Act, Pub. L. No. 82-599, 86 Stat 1325
(1972)(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 581c-i (1970 & Supp. I 1972)); repealed by, Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 291 (1974)(codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
83 See Balanced Budget Amendment-S.J. Res. 41: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 142-44 (1994)(statement of Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney
General)(Hereinafter "Dellinger Statement").
84 627 A.2d. 1039, 1040 (Md. 1993).
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because it failed to set forth a standard sufficient to guide the Governor's
discretion.8 The court upheld the Governor's action, explaining that the
balance of power had shifted due to the constitutional amendment.8
However, it stated that the "trend of the cases ... 'is toward greater
liberality in permitting grants of discretion to [executive branch] officials
... in order to facilitate the administration of the laws as the complexity of
governmental and economic conditions increase."'s The court further
determined that these provisions were necessary to carry out the balanced
budget requirement. 8
The addition of the balanced budget amendment to the Maryland
Constitution and the duty to balance the budget increased the Maryland
court's willingness to allow increased executive authority.89 Similar logic
could be used by the President in asserting authority to impound funds.9°
2. Executive Authority Regarding Military Action
Although there are no state experiences on point, the Federal
Amendment might decrease the President's authority regarding military
action. Under the current constitutional framework, the President has the
ability and the authority to react to a military crisis. However, under the
Federal Amendment, should a crisis arise when the budget is in balance,
the President could allocate additional funds only if there were a
congressionally declared military emergency, a declaration of war or a
three-fifths vote to waive the Amendment. If Congress was out of session
and there was a need to send troops abroad, the President would have to
choose amongst violating the Constitution by unbalancing the budget and
sending troops, exercising increased impoundment authority or allowing
national interests to be damaged. 9
'5Id. at 1041.
861d. at 1050-51.
87Id. at 1051 (quoting Dept. of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1060 (Md. 1987)).
88Id. at 1052.
89 Cf. County of Oneida v. Berle, 404 N.E.2d 133, 135-36 (N.Y. 1980). Separation of powers
barred impoundment of funds by the executive in an attempt to maintain a balanced budget.
Interestingly, the New York Governor chose not to use his line item veto authority. The budget
director decided to impound $7 million and claimed the authority was based upon the balanced budget
amendment. The court found that the Governor had no right to impound.
90 Some of President George Bush's advisors urged him to assert that the Constitution provided the
President with line item veto authority prior to the passage of a balanced budget amendment. This
assertion would have been strengthened if there was a constitutional requirement to balance the budget.
91 Proponents respond that the Congress would declare an emergency when it came back in
session. The President, however, would have no guarantee that Congress would approve the measure.
If it did not, the money already would have been spent and the budget would be unbalanced. The
President would then need the authority to impound funds in other areas. But see, 141 CONG REC.
S2934 (daily ed. Feb 22, 1995)(statement by Sen. Sarbanes)(noting that national emergencies do not
always receive constitutional majorities, and citing provisions to extend the draft for World War II
which passed the House of Representatives by less than a constitutional majority); see supra note 31.
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3. Executive Officers' Refusal to Issue Debt
The Federal Amendment places the burden of balancing the budget on
both Congress and the Executive. Therefore the executive branch could
conceivably refuse to issue debt authorized by the legislature because it
believes that such an issuance would violate the Amendment. The Illinois
Court addressed this situation in People ex rel. Ogilivie v. Lewis.92
In Ogilivie,93 a dispute arose between the Governor and the Secretary of
State regarding the sale of transportation bonds. The State of Illinois
ratified a new constitution in 1970 which allowed the State to issue
transportation bonds. 94 In reliance on the passage of this new constitution,
the Illinois legislature passed a law allowing the sale of $900,000,000
worth of transportation bonds. 95  The Governor determined that
$100,000,000 of the $900,000,000 authorized should be issued?6 The
Secretary of State refused to issue the bonds claiming that the bonding
measure violated the constitution since it was vague, indefinite, and a
violation of separation of powers9 7 The Governor sought a writ of
mandamus directing respondent to act. 8 The court held that the statute
was constitutional and ordered the issuance of the bonds.99
A similar situation might occur at the federal level. The executive and
the legislature may differ regarding Section 2 of the Amendment and what
constitutes "debt held by the public." Congress could modify the term or
assert that debt held by a borrowing authority was not "debt held by the
public," or Congress could create a capital budget and assert that bonds
sold for purposes of the capital budget not be considered "debt held by the
public." The executive branch might refuse to issue these bonds based on
its belief that the statute is unconstitutional and the issuance of debt would
violate the Constitution. The judiciary would then have to determine the
constitutionality of the legislation and the validity of the Executive's
action. 101
92274 N.E.2d 87 (11. 1971).93 1d.
94 I. CONSr. art. XIII, § 7.
95 People ex rel. Ogilivie, 274 N.E.2d at 89.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 96.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 This scenario may arise in other instances when the Congress tries to find creative ways to
obfuscate the Amendment, and the Executive objects to those actions.
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D. Impact of the Federal Amendment on other Constitutional Provisions
1. Limitation on a Citizen's Right of Redress
The balanced budget requirement also may change the way courts
interpret other provisions of the Constitution.10' In Nicholson v. Cooney,
the Montana Supreme Court used the state's balanced budget amendment
to limit the referendum power granted in other parts of the Montana
Constitution. 102 Under the Montana Constitution, if enough signatures are
placed on a referendum, legislation will be held invalid until the provision
is voted on by the people.1°3
In Nicholson, voters in Montana obtained enough signatures to
temporarily invalidate a revenue measure.1 4 The temporary invalidation
forced the legislature to come back into session to try to balance the
budget. 105 The court held that the referendum provision could not be read
in isolation and that the balanced budget provision requires a conclusion
that general revenue bills are off limits to the referendum process.106 Thus,
the amendment eliminated a power generally available to the people.
It is impossible to determine how the Federal Amendment will affect
the interpretation of other provisions of the Constitution. It may give the
President increased authority over taxing and spending decisions, or it may
be used to justify increased delegation of congressional authority to the
President or other officers. The judicial consequences are uncertain, but
what is certain is that the federal courts will have to grapple with these
questions just as the state courts have been required to do.
2. Greater Congressional Delegation of Budgetary Authority to the
President.
The Federal Amendment may influence traditional analysis regarding
the separation of powers. The Florida Supreme Court addressed this issue
in Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F. 107 The Governor determined that
the Florida budget was out of balance and ordered all agencies to prepare a
revised fiscal plan. 0 8 An administrative commission then adopted the
Governor's recommendation. 9 The court needed to determine if the
legislature's assignment to the executive branch of the authority to reduce
101 Nicholson v. Cooney, 877 P.2d 486 (Mont. 1994).
102 d at 491.
1031d at 488.
104 Id
105[ 1
106 id at 491.
107589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991).
108 I1 at 262.
1091 d
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the budget during a shortfall violated Florida's separation-of-powers
doctrine 10  The court found this statutory provision to be an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the executive branch."'
However, this case highlights that some members of the judiciary may
believe that a balanced budget amendment is of such import that it expands
the authority of the executive branch. For example, the dissent in Chiles
argued:
It cannot be denied that the balanced budget provision of the Florida
Constitution is a state law of great weight and importance. It necessarily
follows that the Governor, acting with the Commission, is both obligated and
empowered by the Constitution itself to assure that the balanced budget
mandate of the Constitution is faithfully executed. If the legislature were to
refuse to adopt measures necessary to balance an unbalanced budget, the
Governor would not be relieved of the constitutional obligation to employ
the supreme executive power of the State to assure the budget was
balanced. 1
12
The dissent believed that the need to maintain a balanced budget was
paramount. The balanced budget requirement is deeply routed in Florida' s
legislative system and is designed to protect the public and future
generations. The dissent argues that this provision must be guaranteed to
the greatest extent possible. 113
If the Supreme Court followed the logic of the dissent in Chiles, the
federal separation-of-powers doctrine might be weakened and the Court
might allow Congress to delegate budgetary decisions to the executive.
E. State Court's Have Not Always Adjudicated Balanced Budget Disputes
State courts often prefer not to be involved in budgetary decisions and
dismiss balanced budget cases as either moot or nonjusticiable. In Bishop
v. Governor,n 4 taxpayers and Members of the General Assembly sued the
Governor of Maryland, claiming his budget was unconstitutional. 115 The
Governor had submitted a budget that included estimated revenues based
on the assumption that the General Assembly would enact a lottery
provision and the federal government would extend the revenue sharing
1101d at 263.
Ill jad at 265-66.
112 Id at 270 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
1131d
114 380 A.2d 220, 222 (Md. 1977).
115 Id at 220.
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program.1 6 The plaintiff argued that since the revenues were contingent
revenues, they could not be included as part of estimated revenues in the
Governor's budget.17 The court would not pass on the controversy
because the point was moot."8 The fiscal year had ended and the
necessary legislation had been enacted. The court, however, noted that it
would hear such a case in the future if extraordinary circumstances
existed." 9
In Board of Education of the Township of Fairfield v. Kean,120 a local
school district challenged a law which reduced the General Formula Aid
for Education in the state.'2' The Board of Education challenged the action
and argued that prior decisions in New Jersey guaranteed a certain level of
funding for education.12 The Board sought a court order requiring higher
funding levels for education.'2 The court rejected the Board's challenge,
stating: "It is a rare case-and the present case is most certainly not one of
them-in which the judiciary has any proper constitutional role in making
budget allocations."'' 24
These cases point out that state courts have often exercised judicial
restraint regarding budgetary matters, and, perhaps, the federal judiciary
will exercise similar restraint. However, the consequences of complete
restraint at the federal level are far more severe than at the state level.
Specifically, the super majority requirements may lead to continued
gridlock. The implied impoundment power to the President may raise
serious balance of power questions. The definition of receipts, outlays and
debt may gridlock budget debates for years.
Budget gridlock, not balanced budgets may be the result of a balanced
budget amendment. A federal government in continued gridlock over the
enforcement of the balanced budget amendment will have a severe impact
on the economy and on the citizenry's faith in the national government.
116 ,d at 221-22.
1171d at 222.
l181d at 223.
12D457 A.2d 59 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1982).
121 Id at 59.
122Id. at 60-63. See Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973), 63 N.J. 196 (1973), 67 N.J. 35
(1975), 69 N.J. 133 (1975), 69 N.J. 449 (1976).
123 457 A.2d at 63.124 1d at63.
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II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY DOES NOT PRECLUDE
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT
Proponents of the Federal Amendment have attempted to use its
legislative history to clarify the role of the judiciary and to avoid some of
the problems encountered by state courts. However, due to the
controversial nature of the Federal Amendment, the need to secure enough
votes for passage, and the conflicting views even among proponents, the
legislative history does not provide a safeguard against judicial activism.
Both sides agree that the courts will be involved in interpreting the
Federal Amendment, but they disagree as to the extent of court
involvement. 125 Furthermore, the sponsors themselves often do not agree
regarding the interpretation of various provisions of the Federal
Amendment. This section analyzes the legislative history regarding the
Amendment to determine congressional intent with respect to judicial
involvement.
A. The Committee Report and Statements by Members do not Clarify
Congressional Intent
The Judiciary Committee report in the 103rd Congress attempted to
address concerns regarding the role of the judiciary under the Amendment.
One concern addressed by the opponents of the legislation is that the
Amendment will increase the President's power regarding
impoundment. 126 Section 1 of the Amendment requires that "total outlays
for any fiscal year shall not exceed total receipts for that fiscal year unless
waived by three-fifths vote."'27 The report states the Committee's belief
that "the Congress and the President ... will exercise their powers under
the first and second articles of the [A]mendment to ensure that outlays do
125 See 141 CONG. REC H758 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995)(statement by Rep. Schaefer) ("There is no
need-and arguably it would be a bad idea--explicitly to foreclose the possibility of judicial
interpretation or enforcement."); See also 132 CONG. REc. 4027 (1986)(statement by Sen. Hatch).
Senator Hatch stated "any Member of Congress would have standing to sue to enforce the explicit
provisions of the [A]mendment itself." I. He further stated that"the authors have chosen consciously
not to prohibit judicial review altogether of cases and controversies arising in the context of the
proposed [A]mendment in the belief that the most serious and unambiguous violations of its provisions
ought to be subject to external check." Id. at 4028. See also statement by Senator Simon: "We know
we have to act and, if we do not act, ultimately the courts will force either us to act or hand the
authority over to the executive branch." Id. at 3949; 141 CONG. REc. S3039 (daily ed. Feb. 23,
1995)(statement by Sen. Nunn) ("[A] balanced budget amendment ... would radically alter the balance
of power among the three branches of [glovernment."); 141 CONG. REc. S2694 (daily ed. Feb. 15,
1995)(statement of Sen. Johnston).126 See supra, section I.C.1.
127S. Rep. No. 163, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1993).
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not exceed receipts and thus no balance of power problem will arise." 128
The report's basic premise is that Congress will pass a budget and increase
the debt limit so that there will be no occasion for the President to claim
additional budgetary powers.
The sponsors of the Amendment believe that Members of Congress will
take their constitutional responsibilities seriously and will enforce the
constitutional provisions because all Members take an oath to uphold the
Constitution. This fails to recognize the possibility that Members can
faithfully attempt to execute their responsibilities seriously as legislators
and still not be able to agree on a budget or on debt ceiling legislation.
During the 1995 budget cycle, a Republican Congress and a Democratic
President could not agree on a budget. The government was shut down on
several occasions. 129 Both the Republican plan and the Democratic plan
balanced the budget, but neither plan had sufficient votes for passage.
Balancing the budget was not the issue that caused the gridlock, the
gridlock was due to conflicting policy choices on how to reach a balanced
budget. The balanced budget amendment does nothing to rectify this
problem, and, in fact, the super majority requirements in the Amendment
may make gridlock more likely. Thus, the assertion that Congress will
balance the budget and that, therefore, there is no need to worry about
presidential impoundment is unrealistic.
The second problem is that the language attempts to resolve the conflict
regarding the balance of power between the branches by saying that there
will be no problem. The sponsors believe that Congress and the President
will balance the budget. However, if the case is before the judiciary, and
the judiciary is being asked to settle a balance of power question that arises
under the Amendment, then it is likely that Congress and the President
were unable, or unwilling to fulfill the responsibilities of Section 1 or 2.
Simply saying that Congress expects there not to be a problem provides no
guidance to the courts, if in fact, a problem arises.
The report in the 104th Congress cites Section 6 as assurance that the
Amendment will not end up in the courts. 130 Section 6 requires "Congress
[to] enforce and implement this article by appropriate legislation, which
128 id
129 See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Shutdown Casts Pall on Washington Area's Holiday Cheer,
WASH .PosT, Dec. 25, 1995, at Al; R.A. Zaldivar, Budget Stalemate Drags On; Both Sides are Pointing
Fingers, Amu,. REP., Dec. 17, 1995, at Al; Brian E. Albrecht, People Pay the Price of Budget Gridlock,
THEPLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 1995, at Al; Leon Hadar, Clinton, Congress in Game of Bluff Over U.S.
Budget, BusiNss TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1995, at 15; Carol Byrne, Congress, Clinton on Track for Budget
'Wreck', THE STARTRDuINE, Sept. 3, 1995, at Al.
'30S. REP. No. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1995).
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may rely on estimates of outlays and receipts." 13 The report claims,
"[t]his section makes explicit what is implicit, that Congress has a positive
obligation to fashion legislation to enforce this article.... [This] provision
precludes any interpretation of the [A]mendment that would result in a
shift in the balance of powers among the branches of government."1
The Amendment creates an affirmative duty upon Congress to
implement the Amendment through legislation, but it does not preclude
others from implementing the Amendment through other means. For
instance Section 6 does not explicitly preclude the President from
enforcing the Amendment through impoundment authority, nor does it
prevent the courts from ordering remedies.133 The Fourteenth Amendment
includes language similar to Section 6, and the courts have been involved
in Fourteenth Amendment litigation since its inception.
In fact, Senator Simon was asked on the Senate floor what would
happen if the Congress did not enact implementing legislation. Senator
Simon stated:
Any citizen could go into the courts and the courts would probably tell
us, 'You have 60 days to work something out, Congress....'
We know we have to act and, if we do not act, ultimately the courts will
force either us to act or hand the authority over to the executive branch. 134
Other proponents of the Amendment have argued for court involvement.
At a hearing of the Joint Economic Committee, Senator Mack stated, "I
hope that the times the courts are involved in these decisions are very,
very, very few. But because the issue is so significant, if they have to be
involved to help force us along the way then so be it."1 Congressman
Schaefer, one of the lead sponsors of the Amendment in the House,
claimed "the courts could make only a limited range of decisions on a
limited number of issues. They could invalidate an individual
appropriation or tax act. They could rule as to whether a given Act of
13 1 1,j
1321,d
133 Senator Hatch, the primary Senate sponsor of the Amendment, stated: "the [Ajmendment does
not grant to the President any additional authority, and, in fact, is intended only to circumscribe
Congress' taxing, borrowing and spending powers." 140 CONGc REc. S 1972 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1994).
See also S. REP. No. 5, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1995)("[]t is not the intent of the committee to grant
the President any impoundment authority under S.J. Res. 1.").
134 132 CONG. REc. S3949 (1986).
135 The Balanced Budget Amendment: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, Pt. 2,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1995)(statement by Senator Mack).
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Congress or action by the executive violated the requirement of this
[A]mendment." 136
Although some proponents discourage court involvement, others
believe that the judiciary plays an important role in enforcing the
Amendment. In their view, ambiguous congressional intent allows the
judiciary to define its own role in interpreting the Amendment.
Proponents of the Amendment claim that it is self-enforcing because
Congress cannot extend the debt limit unless three-fifths of each body
agrees. 137  However, this language directly conflicts with the report
language regarding Section 1 and the text of Section 6. Both Section 1 and
Section 6 indicate that Congress may use estimates of receipts and outlays.
Therefore, Congress could pass, and the President could sign, a budget
which, in good faith, relied on estimates for receipts and outlays. In the
middle of the year, the economic situation could change, and the estimates
could no longer be accurate. Revenues could be less than expected due to
a recession and slower income growth and spending might increase due to
additional expenditures for unemployment insurance. These changes
would unbalance the balanced budget.
The proponents of the Amendment argue that this would not be a
problem because a negligible deviation from the balanced budget would
not represent a violation of Section 1.138 In the current federal budget, a
two or three percent error, which would be considered "negligible" would
equal thirty to forty-five billion dollars. An error of this magnitude, which
would be permissible under Section 1, would cause the federal government
to exceed the debt limit in violation of Section 2. Congress would thus
need a three-fifths vote to extend the debt limit. If Members did not vote to
extend the debt limit, then some debt obligations of the United States
would not be paid. If this occurred at the end of the fiscal year, Congress
could not raise taxes or cut spending. Thus, the United States would be
faced with either an economic crisis, a constitutional crisis, or a situation
where a minority of Members of one House could extort legislation from
other Members in exchange for their votes on the debt limit.
136 141 CoNG. REc. H754 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995).
137 This provision has been highly criticized for creating minority rule in the Congress. See
Statement by Sen. Byrd, 141 CONG. REC. S3150-53 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1995) citing THE RDFitALIST Nb.
58 (James Madison); see supra note 4.
138 Senator Simon has stated that an error of two or three percent would not be a violation.
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Jan. 5,
1995)(transcript available from the Committee).
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B. Amendments to the Balanced Budget Amendment do not Clarify the
Judiciary's Role
During the 103rd and 104th Congresses, several amendments to the
balanced budget amendment were offered to clarify the role of the courts.
Senators on both sides of the aisle were concerned that if the role of the
judiciary was not clarified, judges might order remedies that included
specific tax increases or spending cuts.
1. The Danforth Amendment and the Reid Substitute.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, 39
Senator Danforth expressed tremendous concern regarding a court's ability
to order tax increases under a balanced budget amendment. In Jenkins, the
Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling that imposed an increase in
property taxes for the Kansas City School District to ensure funding for the
desegregation of the public schools1 40 The Court held that a court can
direct a local government body to levy its own taxes. 41
Opponents of the Federal Amendment rely on Jenkins to conclude that
the judiciary could order tax increases or spending cuts if the Amendment
was violated. Opponents postulate that if a court can order a municipality
to raise its taxes for violating the Constitution, the federal government may
be required to do so as well. 142
Due to his concern over the Jenkins holding, Senator Danforth offered
an amendment which provided that the courts could order only declaratory
judgments as a remedy for violations of the Amendment. 143 The Danforth
amendment was included in the final version of the balanced budget
amendment considered in the 103rd Congress. 44
The debate regarding the Danforth amendment and its inclusion in the
balanced budget amendment illustrates the concern of some proponents
about judicial activism in interpreting and enforcing the Amendment. The
139495 U.S. 33 (1990).
140 Id at 37.
141 Id at 55-57.
142 Opponents of the Danforth amendment argue that Missouri v. Jenkins would not apply to cases
under the balanced budget amendment. In Missouri v. Jenkins the Court ordered a locality to redress
past discrimination. Thus a federal court was ordering a local authority to raise taxes due to a federal
constitutional violation. The Court might not be willing to apply Missouri v. Jenkins to violations by a
coordinate branch of the government.
143 The Danforth amendment would amend Section 6 by adding the following:
The power of any court to order relief pursuant to any case or controversy arising
under this article shall not extend to ordering any remedies other than a declaratory
judgment or such remedies as are specifically authorized in implementing legislation
pursuant to this section.
140 CONG. REc. S1824 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994).
144 The balanced budget amendment, which included the Danforth amendment, was defeated by a
vote of 63 to 37. 140 CONG. REC. D170 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994).
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Danforth amendment did not eliminate a court's ability to adjudicate
disputes; only its ability to order tax increases or spending cuts.
Nevertheless, the Danforth amendment was a clear signal that Congress did
not intend the judiciary to take an activist posture in interpreting the
Amendment.
Senator Reid also expressed concern regarding judicial activism and the
balanced budget amendment. Senator Reid offered a substitute amendment
which made clear that the courts would not be involved in budget policy.
Section 5 of the Reid amendment required that the Amendment "shall be
enforced only in accordance with appropriate legislation enacted by
Congress" 45 The Reid amendment clarified that Congress would be the
only branch to enforce the Amendment, and it specifically provided for an
enforcement mechanism in the Amendment. 46 If, in fact, the proponents
of the balanced budget amendment intended to exclude court involvement,
it is unclear why they did not include the Reid or the Danforth language in
their revised Amendment. 47
Senator Danforth retired after the 103d Congress, and neither the
language from his amendment nor the language from the Reid amendment
was included in the version of the Amendment introduced in the 104th
Congress. The absence of the Danforth language in the version of the
balanced budget amendment considered in the 104th Congress, after the
inclusion of such language in the 103rd Congress, may be interpreted by
the judiciary as an indication that Congress no longer intended to limit the
judiciary's involvement.148 At the very least, the absence of the Danforth
amendment may be a sign to the courts that no clear consensus existed
regarding judicial involvement.149 Because of this ambiguity and the
145 (Emphasis added). The Reid amendment was a substitute constitutional amendment. It
included several provisions in addition to the provision limiting court involvement. 140 CONc. REc.
S 1826 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1994). The Reid amendment also exempted Social Security, created a capital
budget, and provided an exemption for recessions.
146 The remainder of Section 5 provides that "[t]he Congress may by appropriate legislation,
delegate to an officer of Congress the power to order uniform cuts." This provision of the Amendment
was designed to address the separation of powers problems raised in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986).
147 Some of the suggestions from opponents of the measure could improve the Amendment. In
past years, however, the strategy of the proponents has been to refuse any amendments to the bill. By
doing so, they may have actually increased the possibility of confusion regarding the Amendment and
encouraged court involvement.
148 See 141 CONG. REC. S 1742 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995Xstatement by Sen. Kennedy).
149 The drafter's refusal to include either the Danforth or the Reid language in the 104th Congress
emphasizes the point that many of the proponents support judicial involvement. The proponents
included the Danforth language when it was necessary to secure his vote, however, they clearly did not
strongly support its inclusion because after his retirement the language was dropped.
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exclusion of the language in the Amendment in the 104th Congress, the
issue resurfaced during consideration of the Amendment in 1995.
2.The Senate's Attempt during the 104th Congress to Clarify the
Role of the Judiciary
Two amendments were offered during consideration of the balanced
budget amendment in the 104th Congress. The first, offered by Senator
Johnston, prohibited the judiciary from ordering any remedy except
declaratory judgments. This amendment was similar to the Danforth
amendment which was accepted in the 103rd Congress; however, the
Johnston amendment was rejected in the 104th Congress by a vote of fifty-
two to forty-seven. 150
After the rejection of the Johnston amendment, supporters of the
balanced budget amendment were two votes short of the two-thirds
necessary for passage. Senator Nunn spoke on the Senator floor and
informed his colleagues that he would vote for the balanced budget
amendment if language regarding the role of the judiciary was included in
the Amendment. In their search for votes, proponents agreed to Senator
Nunn's demands, and the Nunn language was included in the Amendment
by a vote of ninety-two to eight. 51 Thus, in a period of a week, the Senate
both rejected and accepted almost identical language regarding the role of
the judiciary.
i. The Johnston Amendment would have Limited the Role of the
Judiciary
The Johnston amendment prohibited any court from having the power
to order relief under the Amendment except when specifically authorized
by Congress. 152 Senator Johnston thought the amendment was necessary to
avoid past ambiguity and to address the concerns of legal scholars
regarding the role of the judiciary.1 53
150 141 CONG. REc. S2732 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1995).
151 141 CONG. REc. 53276 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1995).
152 The Johnston amendment stated: "No court shall have the power to order relief pursuant to any
case or controversy arising under this article, except as may be specifically authorized in implementing
legislation pursuant to this section." 141 CONG. REc. S2694 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1995).
153 See, e.g., Constitutional Amendment to Balance the Budget, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 693 at 10
(statement by Laurence Tribe, professor, Harvard University "So that one way or another, Members of
Congress, a House of Congress, someone who has been cut off from a program, a taxpayer, these
people will be able to go to court; no question about it.") Robert H. Bork, On Constitutional
Economics, AEI J. ON Gov'T AN) Soc'y, at 18 (Sept-Oct. 1983), reprinted in Proposed Balanced
Budget Constitutional Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 645, 649 (1987)("The result would
likely be hundreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits around the country, many of them on inconsistent
theories and providing inconsistent results. ") Balanced Budget Amendment-Senate Joint Resolution
41, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 423 at 186 (statement of Kathleen Sullivan, professor, Stanford University
"enforcement of the [bjalanced [b]udget [almendment would inevitably wind up on the doorsteps of the
state and federal courts, and ultimately at the Supreme Court." Balanced Budget Amendment-Senate
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The Johnston amendment explicitly stated that the judiciary could not
order relief under the Amendment. The judiciary could still determine if
budgets were constitutional or if Congress was acting within the
restrictions of the Amendment, but the judiciary could not order relief or
order Congress to take any specific action.
The Johnston amendment was not as exclusive as the Nunn amendment,
which was ultimately passed by the Senate. The Johnston amendment
limited relief except if Congress authorized otherwise, but it still permitted
the judiciary to make important decisions regarding how the Amendment
would be implemented and how the terms of the Amendment were defined.
For example, there was a question raised during the debate on the
Federal Amendment regarding the power of the Vice President to vote to
break a tie. 154 Under the Johnston amendment, the Court could clarify this
provision; however, it could not order any specific remedy. But, under the
Nunn amendment, the Court could not make a determination regarding the
constitutionality of the Vice President's vote unless specific legislation
authorized the court to do so. Furthermore, under the Johnston
amendment, the judiciary could also decide cases regarding the definition
of "revenue," "outlays," "debt" and other terms used in either the
Amendment or the implementing legislation, while the Nunn amendment
would eliminate the Court's jurisdiction to hear these cases.
The Johnston amendment struck a more proper balance. It allowed the
judiciary to be involved in interpreting the meaning of the Amendment and
the implementing legislation while prohibiting the judiciary from ordering
specific remedies. The judiciary would thus be able to interpret the
Amendment and ensure clarity in its interpretation while only having the
power to order those remedies specifically authorized by Congress in
implementing legislation.
ii. The Nunn Amendment Limits Federal Court Involvement
Even Further than the Johnston Amendment
The original version of the Nunn amendment was very similar to the
Johnston amendment, but in its final form the Nunn amendment restricts
Joint Resolution 41, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 423 at 193 (statement of Burke Marshall, professor, Yale
University: "I have little doubt that the courts ultimately would, however reluctantly, exercise the
power of judicial review over such questions as the meaning of the language."); Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 5, 1995)(statement of Former Attorney
General BarrXtranscript available from the CommitteeX"I would be the last to say that the standing
doctrine is an ironclad shield against judicial activism. The doctrine is malleable and it has been
manipulated by the courts in the past." but cf. "In my view, though it is always difficult to predict the
course of future constitutional law development, the courts' role in enforcing the balanced budget
amendment will be quite limited.")
154 See infra section III.A.
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judicial involvement even more radically than the Johnston amendment.
The original Nunn amendment prohibited the judiciary from ordering relief
other than a declaratory judgment or "such remedies as are specifically
authorized in implementing legislation pursuant to this section."'
Senator Hatch, the lead sponsor of the Amendment, opposed the Nunn
amendment. He pointed out that a declaratory judgment can be just as
intrusive as an injunction. 'When a court declares a statute
unconstitutional, it has the same effect as enjoining the Constitution." 56
Senator Hatch then argued that the Nunn amendment was unnecessary
because the role of the judiciary could be determined in implementing
legislation.
Senator Nunn then modified his amendment which stated, "[T]he
judicial power of the United State shall not extend to any case or
controversy arising under this article except as may be specifically
authorized by legislation adopted pursuant to this section."' 157 This
language was more restrictive than previous amendments which attempted
to limit the remedies which the judiciary could impose. The Nunn
amendment limited the judiciary's power to hear any cases under the
balanced budget amendment unless that power was specifically authorized
by the Congress in implementing legislation.
Under Senator Nunn's amendment, the judiciary would be prohibited
from interpreting the Amendment and would only be empowered to do so
by implementing legislation. Senator Nunn's amendment, in effect,
codified Senator Hatch's approach, but started from the premise of no
judicial involvement unless specifically authorized in implementing
legislation, while Senator Hatch started from the premise that the Congress
could limit the judiciary's power in implementing legislation if that became
necessary.
In addition, passage of the Nunn amendment might increase the states'
role in interpreting the Amendment. Although the Nunn amendment will
eliminate federal jurisdiction regarding the Amendment, it does nothing to
prohibit state courts from hearing these cases. Under that scenario, final
155 The Nunn Amendment would have added to Section 6 the following language:
The power of any court to order relief pursuant to any case or controversy arising under this
article shall not extend to ordering any remedies other than a declaratory judgment or such
remedies as are specifically authorized in implementing legislation pursuant to this section.
141 CONG. REc. S3038 (daily ed. Feb 23, 1995).
156 Although Senator Hatch spoke against the Nunn amendment, in the search for additional votes,
he later agreed to include the Nunn language and voted in favor of the Nunn amendment. 141 CONG
REc. 3042 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995)(Hatch's opposition); 141 CONG. REc. S3276 (daily ed. Feb. 28,
1995)(vote on Nunn amendment).
157 141 CONG. REc. S3044 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995)(Statements by Sen. Hatch and Sen. Nunn).
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determinations under the Federal Amendment might be determined at the
state level.
The Nunn amendment shifts the balance regarding judicial involvement.
It assumes that the judiciary will not be involved unless Congress
specifically authorizes its involvement, and under the Nunn amendment the
Congress could completely prohibit any review of the Amendment by the
Supreme Court. Thus, the balanced budget amendment, with the inclusion
of the Nunn language, could be one of the only amendments in the
Constitution that could not be enforced by the judiciary. 158
If the judiciary is prohibited from reviewing or enforcing the
Amendment, and Congress already has the statutory ability to balance the
budget, then the benefits of the balanced budget amendment are severely
limited. If the Amendment provides no greater enforcement power than
that which Congress has already under current law, the Amendment no
longer provides a "way to balance the budget." If Congress determines
when the judiciary will have authority to review cases under the balanced
budget amendment, it will do so in implementing legislation which must be
passed by a majority vote and signed by the President. If Congress passed
a statutory balanced budget requirement, the same majority vote would be
needed to exceed statutory rules regarding a balanced budget. Thus, while
the balanced budget amendment with the Nunn language may provide
some psychological impetus for balancing the budget, with the inclusion of
the Nunn language, a statutory approach may be as effective as a
constitutional one. 59
The legislative history surrounding the Nunn, Johnston, Reid and
Danforth amendments indicates the reluctance of proponents to completely
rule out judicial involvement in interpreting the Amendment. Amendments
to restrict the judiciary's role are accepted only as a last resort. This
158 Alexander Hamilton expressed concern about "fettering" the Constitution with unenforceable
principles.
Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the [glovernment with restrictions that cannot
be observed; because they know, that every breach of the fundamental laws, though dictated by
necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers
towards the Constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches, where the
same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
THE FEDERALisT Nb. 25 (Alexander Hamilton).
159 The balanced budget amendment would still require that three-fifths of the full House vote to
extend the debt limit. A violation of that provision would not be reviewable under the Nunn
amendment. Since a simple majority could exclude the judiciary from ruling on such an extension, a
majority could undermine the purpose of the Amendment. This ability would be somewhat limited if
the implementing legislation already included the authority for the judiciary to review such cases since
passage in both Houses of Congress, though by a majority vote, and the signature of the President
would be necessary to change the implementing legislation. The debt limit provision in the balanced
budget amendment, however, could be achieved equally well without a constitutional amendment. See
Exon amendment, S. REP. No. 82, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1995).
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indicates, that at least to the proponents of the balanced budget
amendment, amendments limiting the role of the judiciary have some
meaning. They must change the balance of court involvement or the
proponents would not consistently try to avoid including such language.
Limiting language is excluded whenever possible and included only when
necessary. Because of this continual reject-accept approach, the legislative
history is muddled. If, as some of the proponents assert, the intent of
Congress is that the judiciary not be involved in the interpretation of this
Amendment, then the proponents should make the judiciary's role clear
and include specific language in the Amendment. 160
Supporters of the Amendment are relying on the legislative history to
clarify the role of the judiciary under the Amendment. However, this
reliance may be unwarranted. First, as discussed in this section, the
legislative history is extremely confusing. There is no guarantee that the
Court will interpret the legislative history to limit judicial involvement.
Secondly, the Court may never look to the legislative history
surrounding the Amendment. The Court often only looks at the legislative
history surrounding a statute when the wording of the statute itself is
ambiguous.' 6' In this case, the judiciary might determine that without the
Nunn amendment, or some other clarifying language, the intent of
Congress was clear-Congress did not intend to limit the Court's
involvement. If Congress had intended to do so, they would have
explicitly done so in the Amendment itself. Although Congress explicitly
granted themselves the responsibility to enforce the Amendment through
implementing legislation, the Amendment clearly does not give the
Congress the sole power to enforce the Amendment. Without the Nunn or
Johnston language, the judiciary might never consider the legislative
history which was laid out by Senator Hatch.'6
The ambiguity in the legislative history, and the reluctance on the part
of many Members of Congress to legislatively clarify the role of the
160 See 141 CONG REc. S2723 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1995) (statement by Sen. Specter) (Sen. Specter,
a supporter of the Amendment, suggested that it was "advisable for this body to face the jurisdictional
issue squarely.").
161 W. Va Univ. Hosp. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) (holding that when a statute "contains
a phrase that is unambiguous--that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and judicial
practice-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual legislators or
committees during the course of the enactment process."); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).162 Senator Hatch strongly believed that the Court would limit its involvement voluntarily through
standing and the political question doctrine. On several occasions, Senator Hatch stressed this point in
the Congressional Record. He was doing everything that he could to communicate to the Court that
they should limit their involvement to only extreme cases under the Amendment. See 141 Cong. Rec.
S3044 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec. S2149 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995); 141 Cong. Rec.
S2697 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 1995); Id. at S2718; 141 Cong. Rec. S 1830 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1995).
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judiciary regarding the balanced budget amendment, may in itself indicate
that the underlying matter is not appropriate for constitutional treatment.
The Nunn amendment clearly limited the judiciary's role in interpreting the
Amendment, but it further raises the question of why the Amendment is
necessary if only the Congress can enforce the Amendment. Congress
already has the constitutional power to balance the budget, and this
Amendment would give the Congress no additional power or incentive.
Since the Nunn amendment eliminates the major non-legislative
enforcement mechanism, a constitutional amendment to balance the budget
may be only slightly more effective than a statute. If that is the case,
Congress should seriously consider statutory deficit reduction measures
before amending the Constitution.163
C. Clarification of Congressional Intent
Congress's elaboration of the balanced budget amendment has been
purposefully vague in order to ensure enough votes for passage. Since
some supporters believe that the Amendment will not be enforced by the
judiciary and others believe that it will, the judiciary is left with no clear
communication on the issue.
In addition, whenever a problem arises with the Amendment,
proponents claim that it can be solved through implementing legislation.164
They argue that implementing legislation can be used to limit court
involvement, to limit standing, and to ensure that the budget is balanced.
There is no guarantee, however, that implementing legislation will be
163 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, 23 'I AMERICAN PROSPECT 20
(1995).
164 For a list of the problems with the balanced budget amendment that proponents argue can be
solved through implementing legislation; see statement and questions of Sen. Levin to Sen. Simon, 141
CoNQ REC. S2179 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1995).
Sen. Levin: How would the monitoring of the flow of receipts and outlays be done to
determine whether the budget for any fiscal year is on the track of being
balanced?
Sen. Simon: There would have to be monitoring and future legislation would have to
take care of the implementation of that monitoring.
Sen. Levin: What exactly is the definition of receipts and outlays?
Sen. Simon: Implementing legislation will be needed on some of these peripheral
questions.
Sen. Levin: What if the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management
and Budget disagree with each other on what a level of outlays is?
Sen. Simon: Future legislation will have to take care of this.
Sen. Levin: Who will determine the level of receipts and whether a revenue bill is "a
bill to increase revenues?'
Sen. Simon: That will have to be determined through future legislation.
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passed and certainly no guarantee that the implementing legislation will
include provisions to clarify these problems.
Congress should consider implementing legislation concurrently with
consideration of the Amendment to ensure clarity regarding judicial
intervention and presidential authority. 65 As the state cases point out, the
definition of receipts and outlays, the role of the judiciary, the definition of
a "balanced budget," the definition of fiscal year, might all be litigated in
federal court. It would be far clearer to the judiciary and the nation if
Congress considered implementing legislation concurrently with the
consideration of the balanced budget amendment.
Congress rarely passes implementing legislation concurrently with the
passage of a constitutional amendment. Congress did consider
implementing legislation concurrently with the passage of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Although war and the freeing of
millions of slaves may have made concurrent implementing legislation
necessary, the important structural constitutional change also made
concurrent implementing legislation beneficial. In this respect, the
balanced budget amendment is very similar to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. The balanced budget amendment makes a
very significant structural change in the way the United States government
operates. Due to the significant structural change, and the complicated
nature of the subject matter, Congress should pass implementing legislation
concurrently with the Amendment so that the proposed effects of the
measure will be clearly understood.
Passage of implementing legislation concurrently with the Amendment
would not preclude Congress from amending or modifying the
implementing legislation in the future. The budget process is complex and
Congress will certainly not pass perfect implementing legislation.
Nevertheless, concurrent passage of implementing legislation and the
balanced budget amendment will clarify congressional intent regarding the
Amendment.
Supporters of the Amendment may fear that this approach would reduce
the Amendment's chances of passage. Yet, when dealing with the
Constitution, Congress should strive for clarity regarding the implications
of the Amendment.
165 During the 104th Congress, several members promoted a "Right to Know Amendment." 141
CoNa REc. $2277-$2307 (daily ed. Feb. 8 1995). This amendment would have required the
proponents to set out a balanced budget plan before the Amendment was considered. Americans have
the right to know not only how the budget will be balanced, but also what role the judiciary will have in
enforcing the amendment. If Congress were to pass a balanced budget amendment, it should
concurrently pass implementing legislation.
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III. WILL THE STANDING OR THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE LIMIT
JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT?
Proponents of the balanced budget amendment argue that the state
examples are not instructive since federal courts have judicial constructs
that would limit the judiciary's involvement. 166 They mainly cite the
federal judiciary's strict standing rules, or the political question doctrine.167
A. Standing Limitations may not Prevent Judicial Involvementlo
What would happen if the government did not balance the budget, or
the President asserted additional powers to balance the budget, or Congress
passed a budget that evaded the intent of the Amendment? Who could sue
to enforce the constitutional amendment?
The Constitution requires that the power of the judiciary extends to
cases and controversies. 169 One component of this requirement is that a
plaintiff must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. The
Court held that the standing doctrine includes both self-imposed limits on
the judiciary's power and a "core [c]onstitutional" component. 170 The core
constitutional component requires that "a plaintiff must allege personal
injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.'' Therefore, for an
individual to have standing in a federal court, he must show: 1) injury in
166 141 CONG REc. S 1835-36 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995)(Statement by Sen. Hatch); but see, Letter
from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Hatch (Jan. 9, 1995)0etter available
from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary)
"However, none of the commentators, including former Attorney General Barr himself, believe
that the Amendment, as currently written, would bar courts from at least occasional intrusion into the
budget process. Accordingly, whether we face an 'avalanche' of litigation or fewer cases alleging
'serious and clear cut violations,' there is clearly a consensus that the Amendment creates the potential
for the invovlement of courts in issues arising under the balanced budget amendment, and that these
issues are plainly inappropriate subjects for judical resolution."
Id.; see also, Letter from Law School Deans quoted in CONG REC. S7759 (daily ed. June 10,
1992). "Under this Amendment, the responsibility for enforcing a balanced budget will fall upon the
judiciary. We are gravely concerned with the harm certain to be done to the judiciary by requiring the
courts to address fiscal and budgetary questions for which they are completely unsuitable-questions
ranging from the interpretation of the Amendment to the reliability of estimates of future revenues." Id.
167 It is ironic that proponents of the Amendment, who believe so strongly in a balanced budget,
take comfort in citizens' lack of standing to sue to enforce a balanced budget.
168 Because the proponents argue that the standing and political question doctrines will eliminate
judicial involvement, this paper discusses the issues briefly. For a more thorough discussion, see Gay
Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 1065 (1983).
169 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
170 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
171 id.
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fact; 2) causation; and 3) redressability. 172 Proponents of the Amendment
argue that it will be impossible for plaintiffs to satisfy these requirements
and the judiciary will therefore not be presented with any cases or
controversies regarding the Amendment. However, there are several ways
that plaintiffs may be able to satisfy this requirement.
The Court has granted taxpayers standing to sue under the Taxing and
Spending Clause if the congressional action violates an exercise of that
power. 73 In Flast v. Cohen, a taxpayer filed suit to enjoin the allegedly
unconstitutional expenditure of federal funds under Titles I and II of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.174 The Court held that
if a taxpayer can show that an action "exceeds specific constitutional
limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power."'175 the court may grant the taxpayer standing to sue. 176
Since the balanced budget amendment limits the taxing and spending
power, the Flast decision might provide the basis for taxpayer standing to
bring suits challenging violations of the Amendment.177
Thus, if Congress failed to balance the budget and receipts exceeded
outlays, a taxpayer might have standing to sue to enforce the Amendment.
A court could then order relief to remedy violations of the Amendment.
Even if courts do not recognize standing for taxpayers generally, there
will be cases when individuals will have standing to sue. The standing
requirements are not insurmountable for individuals harmed under the
balanced budget amendment. 178
If the President or Congress claimed additional authority pursuant to the
balanced budget amendment, either to impound funds or to withhold
specific benefits, individuals might have standing to raise the
constitutionality of those actions. An individual who failed to receive a
benefit due to the President's impoundment of funds would be able to show
both injury in fact and causation. Redressability also would not be a
172 1d; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992).
173 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1967); U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8.
17 4 Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
17 5 1,d at 102-103.
176 The Flast Court held that a taxpayer must establish a logical link between his status as a
taxpayer and the type of legislative enactment attacked. The taxpayer must also establish a nexus
between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement. Id. at 102.
177 See Balanced Budget Amendment-S.J. Res. 41: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Appriations, 103d Cong, 2d Sess. 182 (1994) (statements of Kathleen Sullivan, professor, Stanford
University; Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General; Archibald Cox, professor, Harvard
University).
178 For the view that there will be individuals with standing, see Dellinger, Sullivan, Cox, supra
note 177. Cf Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 5,
1995)(transcript available from the Committee)(statement of former Attorney General William Barr).
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problem, since the taxpayer could seek an injunction against the
President's action.
A similar scenario to the above would be very likely under the balanced
budget amendment. In fact, many of the state court cases involving state
balanced budget amendments are brought because either the legislature or
the executive has exceeded its constitutional authority in trying to balance
the budget. 179
Individual taxpayers might also adjudicate cases regarding the balanced
budget amendment in state courts, where the standing rules are far more
liberal. The state courts are accustomed to litigating issues regarding state
balanced budget restrictions, and they may be willing to hear federal cases
at the state level.
In ASARCO v. Kadish,180 the Court held that state courts could hear
federal questions even if standing would not have been available in federal
court.181 In ASARCO, taxpayers and a teachers' union brought suit against
ASARCO, a mining company, claiming that Arizona's statute governing
mineral leases on state lands violated federal laws. 182 The teachers claimed
that the State's leasing arrangement "deprived the school trust funds of
millions of dollars thereby resulting in unnecessarily higher taxes." 183 The
Court held that the teachers and the taxpayer would not have had standing
in federal court, but since "the [s]tate courts are not bound to adhere to
federal standing requirements, they posses the authority absent a provision
for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions that
rest on their own interpretations of [flederal law."184 Once the state court
has heard a case, the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review the
case even though it would not have conferred standing on the plaintiff in
the original action. 18
A suit brought to enforce the balanced budget amendment might follow
the pattern established in ASARCO. A taxpayer might bring suit in state
court claiming violations of both the state and federal constitutions. As in
179 See supra section I.
180490 U.S. 605 (1988).
18i Id. at 617. "We have recognized often that the constraints of Article 111 do not apply to state
courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or
other federal rules of justiciability even when they address issues of federal law, as when they are
called upon to interpret the Constitution or, in this case, a federal statute." Id. (emphasis added).
1821Jd at 610.
1831,d at 614.
184 Id at 617.
185 Id. at 618. Once a person has gained standing in state court, any decision for the plaintiff
creates a harm to the defendant. Once the state court judgment creates a specific legal obligation upon
the defendant, that obligation creates a direct injury and the federal court has jurisdiction to hear the
case.
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ASARCO, the complaint could very generally allege that an action caused
higher taxes, or that the unbalanced budget caused an increase in interest
rates for businesses that needed capital. Once state courts made a final
determination regarding the case, the decision would stand unless
overturned by the Supreme Court.186
In addition to individual taxpayer standing, Members of Congress may
at times have standing in their capacity as Members. Although various
circuit court decisions have limited this doctrine, the Supreme Court has
yet to provide a clear doctrine of congressional standing. 187 In debate
regarding the constitutional amendment, several proponents of the measure
have suggested that in some circumstances Members of Congress should
have standing to challenge violations of the Amendment. 18
There have been several cases in the circuit courts regarding the
doctrine of congressional standing; however, the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the proper scope of congressional standing. A series of decisions
grant Members of Congress standing when they have suffered injuries in
their capacity as legislators. In Kennedy v. Sampson,189 the D.C. Circuit
held that Senator Kennedy had standing to sue regarding President Nixon's
use of the pocket veto because his vote in favor of the legislation had been
nullified by the President's action.190 Courts in other cases, while rejecting
Member standing, have indicated a willingness to confer standing to
Members in certain situations. 191
A second line of cases, however, has required not only that the
individual Congressman suffer a specific injury, but also that the legislators
186 This problem would not exist if the plaintiff was suing a federal official, since the federal
official could have the case removed to federal court. 28 U.S.C. 1442 (1994). This does not eliminate
the ASARCO problem since suits may arise under the Amendment which do not involve federal
officials. If Congress was trying to subvert the Amendment, it might create quasi-government or
private companies to borrow for the government. A suit against these agencies would not be removable
under § 1442.
187 Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977)(Member of Congress lacked standing to sue
the CIA since there was no injury in fact); Riegle v. FOMC, 656 F.2d. 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981)(Sen. Riegle did not have standing to seek injunctive relief against the
current appointment process for Federal Reserve Governors even though he suffered personal injury.);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Melcher v. FOMC, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1981). But cf. Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(Sen.
Kennedy had standing to challenge the constitutionality of President Nixon's improper "pocket veto.");
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939)(State Senators had standing regarding the
constitutionality of the lieutenant Governor's right to break a tie vote).
18 128 CONG. REc. 18502 (statement by Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG. REc. H754 (daily ed. Jan. 26,
1995)(statement by Rep. Schaefer). "A member of Congress, or an appropriate administration official,
probably would have standing to file suit challenging legislation that subverted the [A]mendment."
'89511 F.2d at 430.
190 M at 433.
191 Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1977)("We do not hold that a Congressman
may never seek a declaratory judgment of executive illegality, but that such a request must be
accompanied by allegations of a particular concrete injury.").
[Vol. XII: 15 3
Will Judges Become Accountants?
have no ability to redress their problem in the legislative field. In Riegle v.
FOMC,192 Senator Riegle sought an injunction against the appointment of
Federal Reserve Board members who were appointed by the Federal
Reserve Banks without the advice and consent of the Senate. The court
held that Senator Riegle's inability to exercise his right under the
Appointments Clause is an injury sufficiently personal to constitute an
injury in fact, 193 but the court held that before a Member will be able to
seek a judicial remedy, he must lack collegial or "in home" remedies.194
These doctrines have not yet been reconciled and the most recent cases
in circuit courts suggest that Members of Congress will have standing only
in extreme situations. However, there are situations where Members of
Congress may meet these requirements. Section 2 of the balanced budget
amendment requires that there be a three-fifths vote to increase the debt
held by the public. If Congress redefines debt by the public or creates off-
budget entities to avoid the debt limit, a Member might be able to claim
that his vote has been diluted and that he has suffered a harm. Under the
Kennedy v. Sampson line of cases, a Member in such a situation might be
found to have standing to enforce the constitutional violation.
Problems might also arise under Section 4 which requires a majority of
the whole body to increase revenues. First, Members might disagree on
what constituted a revenue increase. If an increase occurred without a
majority of the whole number, a Member might successfully argue that his
vote was diluted and the Court might find that the Member had standing to
sue.
A second problem might arise under Section 4 regarding the Vice
President's right to break a tie vote. The legislative history regarding this
issue is in direct conflict-the House of Representatives claims that the
Vice President will still cast the deciding vote regarding revenue increases
while the Senate claims that the Vice President will have no such
authority. 95 A Member of Congress will likely have standing to bring
192 656 F.2d at 873.
'931d at 878.
1941d at 881.
195See statement by Rep. Schaefer, 141 CoNG. REC. H758 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1995) ("This
language is not intended to preclude the Vice President, in his or her constitutional capacity as
President of the Senate, from casting a tie-breaking vote that would produce a 51-50 result.") But see
statement by Sen. Hatch, 141 CONG. Wc. S2929 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1995) ("I personally believe that
the Vice President's vote will not count in this situation because we will have to have 51 Senators of
the whole number of 100 actually vote.") Super or special majorities such as this one do not always
work to decrease the budget deficit. President Clinton's economic plan, the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1993 (OBRA), decreased the deficit by over $500 billion and passed by a vote of 51 to 50 with
the Vice President casting the tie vote. 139 CONG REc. S10764 (1993). Since OBRA raised revenue,
the Act would have failed under the Senate interpretation of the balanced budget amendment. The
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such an action claiming that his vote was diluted by the Vice President's
vote. 196
The doctrine of Member standing is still uncertain; however, it is
possible that Members of Congress will have standing to sue when
questions regarding the balanced budget amendment specifically harm
them in their capacity as Members. 197
The standing doctrine may, in fact, limit a citizen's ability to bring suits
under the Amendment, however, Congress' sole reliance on the standing
doctrine as a means for limiting judicial interference is extremely risky.
The Court may determine that citizens, Members of Congress, or specific
aggrieved parties have standing to sue. In addition, individuals may bring
their claims to state courts which are not bound by the Article III standing
requirements. These cases would then reach the Supreme Court on appeal
and the individuals would then have standing in federal court. Finally,
Congress might statutorily grant standing to aggrieved parties and the
statutory grant might survive constitutional challenge. With the very real
possibility that the standing doctrine will not be a complete bar to
litigation, it should not be relied upon as the main defense against judicial
involvement.198
defeat of OBRA would have stopped a tax increase, but it would have also hampered attempts to reduce
the deficit and balance the budget.
196 The issue of the Vice President's right to vote as President of the Senate has arisen recently in
the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Virginia Senate is currently in a 20 to 20 split between
Republicans and Democrats. The Lieutenant Governor, as presiding officer, has the authority to break
ties. However, the Virginia Constitution also requires a "majority of the members elected" for issues
concerning taxes, debt, and constitutional amendments. The Lieutenant Governor cast his vote in favor
of the amendment. The opponents have argued that the Lieutenant Governor is not a member of the
Senate and therefore cannot vote on measures related to debt, taxes, or the constitution. The opposition
party has decided to file suit against the Lieutenant Governor. This same argument will likely arise at
the federal level if the balanced budget amendment is enacted. Peter Baker, Beyer's Tiebreaker
Plunges Va. Senate Into Fight on Rules, WASH. PosT, Feb. 6, 1996, at BI, B3.
197 Members of Congress could legislatively resolve the standing issue. Their failure to do so even
after the consideration of this Amendment highlights the conflict within the Congress regarding this
Amendment. Some members do not want constitutional violations to go unchecked and therefore
would like Members to have standing, but others do not want the courts to impinge on the basic
budgetary decisions of the Nation. See statement by Sen. Johnston, 141 CONG REc. S2694 (daily ed.
Feb. 15, 1995).
198 Some legal commentators argue that the standing doctrine has been selectively employed to
restrict or deny access to litigants who previously would have enjoyed such access. LAWRENCE 'IBE,
AMER1cANCONMMsMfltONAL LAw 110 (1988). Others have argued that the Court has manipulated the
standing doctrine to advance its views of the merits. Gene Nichol Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment
on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. lv. 635, 649-59. What is clear is that the standing doctrine has
dramatically changed over the last thirty years. The political question doctrine and the standing
doctrine were both used to limit the Court's involvement in specific cases. As the composition of the
Court has changed, the Court's willingness to dismiss suits for political question reasons has
diminished, and the Court's willingness to limit suits based on the standing doctrine have increased. As
time passes, the standing doctrine may prove to be an insufficient method for limiting suits under the
balanced budget amendment.
Will Judges Become Accountants?
B. The Political Question Doctrine may not Prevent Judicial Interference
If the courts determine that an individual has standing to bring a suit
under the Amendment, they may further limit the judiciary's involvement
by holding that these issues are nonjusticiable political questions. A court
does not hold an issue nonjusticiable as a political question simply because
the issue is political. Alexis de Toqueville observed that "[t]here is hardly
a political question in the United States that does not sooner or later turn
into a judicial one."' 99 A nonjusticiable political question is one in which
no judicially cognizable standard exists by which the court can judge the
constitutionality of a specific action."
In Baker v. Carr,201 the Court set out the standard by which a case may
be considered a political question.2X2 The court, however, has rarely
invoked the political question doctrine since deciding Baker v. Carr.203 In
fact, the Supreme Court has been willing to get involved in some very
"political" questions and ones which observers thought the Court might
hold to be political questions.204
In Department of Commerce v. Montana,2 Montana voters, and
Members of Congress brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
federal government's allocation of congressional seats. Under Baker v.
Carr, this might have been a political question, but the Supreme Court held
that "the interpretation of the apportionment provisions of the Constitution
is well within the competence of the judiciary."2
The courts also have been willing to hear cases regarding budget policy,
and specifically overturned provisions of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings).2 7 In
199 DEMocRAcY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969)(vol. 1, part ii, Chap. 8). See also Louis
Henkin, Is there a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597 (1976).
200 STNE, Er AL., CoNsTrroNAL LAW 114 (1991).
201 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
202 To be considered a political question, the case must 1) lack satisfactory criteria for judicial
determination; or 2) be textually and demonstrably committed to a coordinate political department. Id.
at 210-211.
203See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
204 Department of Commerce v. Montana, 112 S.Ct. 1415 (1992); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986); see Dellinger Statement, supra note 83, at 140. It should be noted that one possible rationale
for the scarcity of political question use is tougher standing requirements.
205 112S. Ct. 1415 (1992).
2'6Id at 1426.
207 Bowsher v. Synar was a major intervention by the courts in federal budget policy. It indicates
that the Supreme Court is willing to delve into the details of budget policy when it believes the
Constitution so requires. For a discussion of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Congressional Budget
Act, see WtijAM G. DAUSTER, BuDGEPROCESSLAw ANNOrrATED, Sections103-49 (ed. 1993).
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Bowsher v. Synarm the Supreme Court held that the Congress could not
assign authority to order spending cuts to the Comptroller of the United
States, because the Comptroller was an officer removable by Congress and
was exercising an executive function under the act. Bowsher v. Synar was
a balance of power case dealing with specific budget questions in a highly
political atmosphere. The Supreme Court held this case to be justiciable
and analyzed the constitutionality of very complicated legislation regarding
budget procedure.
It is unclear if this case would be decided the same way if the
Constitution included a specific provision that required a balanced budget.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act was specifically designed to reduce the
deficit, and just this type of enforcement legislation will be necessary to
reduce the deficit under a balanced budget requirement. The balanced
budget amendment--especially Section 6, which gives enforcement
powers to Congress-might provide additional powers to Congress to
achieve deficit reduction. If Congress must enforce the Amendment then a
congressionally appointed officer might have the power to issue sequesters
to ensure compliance with the Amendment.
Although it is unclear to whom the judiciary will provide standing and
in what instances the Court will hold issues to be political questions, it is
probable that in some cases the Court will find standing and justiciability
regarding the balanced budget amendment. These doctrines, therefore,
should not be seen as a sufficient safeguard to prevent judicial activism in
budgetary policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
A majority in Congress advocates the passage of a constitutional
amendment to balance the budget. The proponents believe that this
Amendment will force Congress to make the tough decisions and balance
the budget. The Amendment, however, is either unnecessary or a
significant intrusion on the separation of powers. The judiciary will either
become a "super-auditing" office and enforce the Amendment, or it will sit
on the sidelines and allow Congress to be the sole arbitrator of the
Amendment. If Congress is the sole arbitrator, then the Amendment itself
provides no restriction on Congress that they could not place on themselves
without an Amendment. If the judiciary does become involved in
M0478 U.S. 714 (1986).
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interpreting the Amendment, then an unelected judiciary will have
tremendous power over both the sword and the purse.
Judicial involvement at the state level provides some insight into the
level of involvement that the federal judiciary may undertake in
interpreting the Amendment. State courts have been very willing to enter
into budgetary decisions and to decide cases based on state balanced
budget requirements. Some state courts have interpreted words such as
"outlays" and "receipts," others have determined what kind of borrowing is
permitted, while still others have examined the separation-of-powers
concerns raised by the Amendment. The fiscal straightjacket that these
fiscal restrictions place on governments requires them to seek alternative
methods for dealing with budgets in order to function. The alternative
methods will surely be adjudicated in the courts forcing the judiciary's
involvement in fiscal policy.
The debate over the constitutional amendment for a balanced budget has
been a political one, and the consequences of the Amendment only have
been a secondary concern. The legislative history of the Amendment has
been purposely left vague so that it can be interpreted however each
supporter would like to interpret it. Some supporters feel strongly that the
Amendment should be enforced by the courts, and others believe that the
courts should not get involved in budgetary policy. By leaving the
Amendment vague and not clarifying its enforcement mechanism, the
supporters are able to appeal to both groups.
As a consequence of this intentional ambiguity, there is really no
indication of the intended level of judicial involvement. If the courts
choose, they will be able to find legislative history that supports either
court action or inaction, but the state experience suggests that the courts at
the federal level will be drawn into interpreting the Amendment.
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